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ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard,
an Unworkable Decision*
Jacy T. Jasmer**
I don’t know why this has happened to me. I work hard and I’m
dedicated, but overall I’m totally surprised. What did I do to
deserve this?
-Vanna White1
The celebrity is a person who is known for his wellknownness . . . He is neither good nor bad, great nor petty. He is
the human pseudo event.
-Daniel Boorstin2
INTRODUCTION
In 1997 Tiger Woods became the youngest golfer ever to
win the Masters Tournament3.
Artist Rick Rush
commemorated the historic event in a painting titled “The
Masters of Augusta”, which he later sold to the public.4 Tiger
Woods subsequently sued Rush, asserting that the painting
Rush claimed First
violated Woods’s right of publicity.5
Amendment protection for his work, and both the district court
and the Sixth Circuit agreed.6 In its decision the Sixth Circuit
adopted the test created by the California Supreme Court in

This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2002,
University of North Dakota. For my parents, who will never know how much
they are appreciated.
1. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 127 (1993) (citing Dan Hurley, The
End of Celebrity, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1988, at 50, 55 (quoting Vanna
White)).
2. Id. at 127-28 (citing Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo
Events in America 57 (1961)).
3. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 919; ETW v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio
2000).
*

**
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Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 7,8 Known
as the “transformative elements” test, it is the most recent
judicial attempt to strike a balance between a celebrity’s right
of publicity and an artist’s or author’s First Amendment rights.
It states that “[w]hen artistic expression takes the form of a
literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain,
directly trespassing on the right of publicity without adding
significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law
interests in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the
expressive interests of the imitative artist.”9 However, “when a
work contains significant transformative elements, it is not
only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is
also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected
by the right of publicity.”10
This Comment first addresses the inconsistent and
evolving background of the right of publicity, including the
justifications for the right, its tension with the First
Amendment, and judicial and academic attempts to balance the
two. The Comment then explains the ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publishing, Inc.11 decision in light of this background, focusing
on the Sixth Circuit’s application of the “transformative
elements” test. It is the position of this Comment that while
the “transformative elements” test is essentially workable, the
ETW court’s application of the test was faulty and has the
potential to unjustly derail the test’s usefulness. However, by
recognizing these faults and making a few simple changes,
future courts can ensure that this test receives proper analysis.
This will prevent critics from convincing courts and scholars
that the test has no value to the ongoing debate regarding the
proper way to balance the right of publicity with the First
Amendment.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is generally recognized as an
intellectual property right.12 Its justifications, which include
moral rights, the prevention of unjust enrichment, and the
7. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
8. ETW, 332 F.3d 915.
9. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808.
10. Id.
11. 332 F.3d 915.
12. Gil Peles, Comedy III Productions v. Saderup, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 549, 550 (2002).
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preservation of economic incentives, are controversial.13 The
right of publicity often conflicts with the First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech and expression. In light of the
questionable justifications behind the right of publicity, courts
have struggled for many years to find the appropriate balance
between the two.14 A recent solution to this conflict was the
“transformative elements” test set forth in Comedy III.15 This
decision spurred considerable discussion and debate, and
several commentators proposed a number of alternatives to this
test.16 Therefore, at the time of the ETW17 decision, the
standard for determining the right of publicity in the Sixth
Circuit was uncertain.
A. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S ORIGIN
The right of publicity can be defined as “the right of a
celebrity (or other person) to prevent others from using his or
her name, likeness, or . . . ‘identity’ for commercial purposes
without a license.”18 A product of slow evolution, its ancestors
include unfair competition, misappropriation, tort, fraud, and
most importantly, the right of privacy.19 More recently courts
13. See infra text accompanying notes 27-46.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. 21 P.3d 797.
16. See infra Part I.D.
17. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
18. Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in
Advertising: Some Counter-Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 594 (1996) (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring
1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human Persona as Commercial
Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129 (1995)).
19. See Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 478
(2003); John Gillison, Recent Development, California’s Right of Publicity
Undergoes a Significant Transformation: Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 29 W. ST. U.L. REV. 359, 362 (2002).
While the “right of privacy” is “primarily intended to protect a person’s
feelings and sensibilities rather than to safeguard property, business, or other
pecuniary interests,” the “right of publicity” recognizes that the “association of
one’s name, face or likeness with a business, product or service creates a
tangible and salable product in much the same way as property may be
created by one who organizes under his other name a business to build or sell
product.” 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 25 (2003). Thus, while the rationales for
a right of publicity can be broken down into specific “economic incentive”
arguments,
“unjust enrichment” justifications, and even “moral
justifications,” the right as recognized in the United States is more closely
aligned with property rights, and as such, primarily protects economic
interests.
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and academia have started to view the right of publicity as a
form of intellectual property.20
The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Labs,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.21 in 1953.22 The U.S.
Supreme Court approved of a right of publicity in 1977 when it
held that a news station violated a plaintiff’s state law right of
publicity by videotaping and re-broadcasting his entire human
cannonball act without permission.23 Today at least thirty-six
states have adopted some form of a right of publicity either
through a statute or the common law.24
While the right of privacy has been widely established,
there has been great disagreement as to its justifications. In
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,25 the Supreme
Court noted that the right of publicity served three basic
functions: (1) it prevented others from being unjustly enriched
by the plaintiff’s good will, (2) it kept others from interfering
with the plaintiff’s right to make a living as an entertainer, and
(3) it provided entertainers and celebrities an economic
incentive to continue to invest in creating performances that
the public could enjoy.26 Courts generally follow Zacchini, but
disagreements over the relative merit and importance of each
of these three justifications remains.27
The economic justification for a right of publicity is heavily
relied upon by courts and scholars, despite the fact that this
justification is quite controversial.28 As some critics note, the
right of publicity “rewards far more than exemplary
achievement; it offers no incentives to those who become
famous accidentally, such as lottery winners.”29 This statement
20. See Peles, supra note 12.
21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
22. Lee, supra note 19, at 478; Gillison, supra note 19, at 362.
23. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976).
24. Lee, supra note 19, at 479.
25. 433 U.S. 562.
26. Id. at 576.
27. Vincent M. de Grandpré, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An
Economic Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 74 (2001). Mr. de Grandpré notes that some courts
question whether a right of publicity is justified at all, while others only
“disagree about the likelihood and extent of injuries that result from
unauthorized expressive uses of celebrity likeness.” Id. at 74.
28. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
29. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 101-02 (citing JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS,
FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA
245-49 (1996)).
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requires an inquiry into whether the right of publicity is the
best way to promote fame and achievement.30 Fame existed
long before the right of publicity was invented, and “no one
apparently needed the law’s protection to become famous before
this century.”31 Nevertheless, while a right of publicity might
only give minimal incentive to create fame, it offers greater
incentives to prevent the over-exploitation of a celebrity’s image
or persona.32 It is not clear, however, that society needs to
prevent over-exploitation of a celebrity’s image. Not “all uses of
human identity tire the public”;33 and certain uses of a
celebrity’s persona may actually increase the so-called “shelf
life” of the celebrity’s image or fame.34
The moral rights justification35 for the right of publicity is
30. Id. at 102. Mr. de Grandpré notes:
Even without invoking such an extreme case [as the lottery winner
example], the importance of skills or talent in the making of celebrity
should not be overstated. Fame rewards pure talent only unreliably
and, as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION points
out: ‘[i]n other cases the commercial value acquired by a person’s
identity is largely fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment
made by the individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property
and unjust enrichment rationales for protection.’
Id. He continues by explaining that “[m]arginal analysis tells us nothing
about how much the right of publicity contributes to the overall supply of
celebrity” since the “elusive character of fame probably makes it difficult for
an aspiring celebrity to assess rationally the marginal value of additional
preparation.” Id.
31. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 103.
32. Id. de Grandpré states that the “over-exploitation” rationale is the
“better argument” for a right of publicity, but he still finds it insufficient in a
number of ways. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
33. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 104. de Grandpré criticizes the “overexploitation” argument by stating that while “individual consumption of
celebrity identity . . . results in negative externalities” it also “leads to positive
network effects.” Id. This occurs because “[m]any uses of celebrity identity
are faddish and, at certain points along the demand curve for celebrity goods
and services, individual consumptions are not rivalrous, but complementary.”
Id. This occurs for two reasons: a “bandwagon effect, in which early
consumption of goods by some people modifies the tastes of others” and
because “consumption and learning may take place simultaneously.” Id. at
105.
34. Id. at 104. Such uses are primarily informative. See id. at 105. While
unauthorized uses of a person’s identity in news, magazines, etc. do “cause
congestion externalities by adding to a celebrity’s exposure” the “informative
character of these uses creates net positive externalities because . . . [they]
enrich the social meaning of celebrities.” Id.
35. The moral justification argument is best described as a “fruits of labor
argument” and is closely related to the “unjust enrichment” justification. See
infra notes 36-41.
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likewise controversial. A common premise in intellectual
property law is that a person is entitled to the fruits of his or
her labor.36 It can be argued that celebrities “work[] hard to
create an identity that has commercial value.”37 Therefore,
they deserve the benefits gained from this identity. This
argument, however, ignores the fact that the idea of “celebrity”
is the result of a “complex social . . . process in which the ‘labor’
(time, money, effort) of the celebrity herself (and of the
celebrity industry, too) is but one ingredient, and not always
the main one.”38 While a celebrity can, to a certain extent,
increase her strength, knowledge, or even beauty, she cannot
make herself famous “any more than [s]he can make [her]self
loved.”39 Therefore, celebrities and athletes labor to develop
their own skill but not necessarily to develop the commercial
value of their images.40 “[N]amely the public image and
persona of the celebrity, is in large part created by the . . .
media and society.”41 This undercuts the argument that a
person attempting to capitalize on a celebrity’s value is taking
something that is the sole creation of the celebrity.
Closely related criticism attends the unjust enrichment
justification for the right of publicity. The Supreme Court has
viewed the use of a person’s identity without his or her
permission as a “theft of good will.”42 Such use is seen as
“‘reaping’ where others have ‘sown.’”43 However, this argument
is questionable as well. Not only do celebrities “develop
their . . . craft . . . using already-existing forms, sounds,
narratives, and images”,44 but the use of their identity may
actually “advance the development of the sport”45 or art as a
36. Jessica Villardi, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: Why the First
Amendment Should Trump the Right of Publicity When Art Imitates Life, 34
CONN. L. REV. 293, 298-99 (2001) (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954)).
37. Id.
38. Villardi, supra note 36, at 299 (citing Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 125, 195 (1993)).
39. Id. (citing Madow, supra note 38, at 188).
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1976).
43. Villardi, supra note 36, at 299.
44. Id.
45. Id. Villardi explains that “modern athletes . . . often use techniques
invented by other previous greats in order to advance the development of a
sport as a whole.” Id. Viewed in that light, “reaping” where others have
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whole, increasing its value. In turn, the celebrity may reap
greater benefits as an indirect result of this use, in the form of
monetary gain, recognition, or personal satisfaction with their
achievements.46 If such a chain of events occurs, the value of
the celebrity’s identity can not only be credited to their own
talent, but also to the general popularity of the game they play,
music they perform, or the art they create.
B. CONFLICTING INTERESTS AMONG THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
AND FIRST AMENDMENT
Not surprising, the right of publicity and the First
Amendment are often in tension with one another.47 The First
“sown” actually helps create great athletes.” Id.
46. It is a logical extension from Villardi’s argument, supra note 36, that
if the popularity of a sport increases due to an athlete’s personal
achievements, the increased interest in the sport will filter down to the athlete
as an individual, resulting in increased promotional opportunities and media
recognition of the athlete (or celebrity’s) personal efforts. Thus, the cyclical
nature of an athlete’s own achievement may both directly and indirectly
promote celebrity.
47. Artistic expression, among other things, can be considered “speech” for
purposes of the First Amendment.
See CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §11.3.7.1-3 (Aspen L. & Bus.
1997). First Amendment concerns are generally implicated when a state
restricts free speech in some form, such as when it recognizes a right of
publicity. See Villardi, supra note 36. While forms of speech considered to be
“commercial” were once unprotected, the Supreme Court changed this in 1976
when it ruled that “commercial speech,” in addition to speech that is
considered “newsworthy,” is protected by the First Amendment, although to a
lesser extent. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976). The Supreme Court has developed
a strict test for determining the constitutionality of commercial speech:
“[C]ommerical speech may be freely regulated, or even banned, if it is ‘false,
deceptive, or misleading’; but . . . otherwise . . . only if ‘the State shows that
the restriction directly and materially advances a substantial state interest in
a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.’” Barnett,
supra note 18, at 599-600 (citing Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof.
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994)). However, while the “commercial” –
“newsworthy” distinction is no longer supposed to strictly determine the
answer to the preliminary question of whether a particular form of speech gets
protection, some argue that it does still seem to matter. Villardi, supra note
36, at 301-02. Whether or not the “commercial” – “newsworthy” distinction
should matter, and how much it should determine whether or not something
gets full First Amendment protection, remains controversial. See, e.g., Ralph
S. Brown, Copyright and its Upstart Cousin: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair
Competition: The Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 301 (1986); Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the
Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 365 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Amicus Curiae Brief of Seventy-Three Law Professors in Support of Jireh
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Amendment’s goals of promoting an open marketplace of ideas
and freedom of self-expression mean that artists, media, and
other interested parties must be able to write about and
interpret “the thought process of illustrious individuals who
have shaped our society.”48 If the three justifications for the
right of publicity noted above are correct, this view directly
conflicts with the right of entertainers to control the use of
their talent and persona for their own gain.49 Furthermore,
any unauthorized use of another person’s intellectual property
in their image “chills speech by increasing the cost of creating
works.”50 On the other hand, giving others free rein to use of
such property also “chills speech, since it chills [both] the
creation of intellectual property” and “the cost of creating
works” in general.51
The tension between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment right of freedom of expression becomes especially
strong when the person attempting to enforce the right is
someone whose “exploits, activities, accomplishments, and
[even] personal life” are subjected to the spotlight.52 Such
individuals have become part of the fabric of our culture, and
thus the use of their personas becomes important to debate on
public issues, especially those dealing with culture and
values.53 Celebrities often acquire a personal meaning to many
Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2000) (arguing that the
“commercial” – “newsworthy” distinction in right of publicity/First
Amendment jurisprudence is outdated and that the Supreme Court rejected
this distinction in Zacchini).
48. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 68
(1994).
49. When a right of publicity exists, a court typically orders a defendant to
stop the unauthorized use of the celebrity’s likeness or image. Villardi, supra
note 36, at 300. Defendants may then use the First Amendment right to free
speech and freedom of expression as a defense that their use of the “celebrity’s
image or likeness is speech that is entitled to constitutional protection and
cannot be restricted by the state.” Id. Allowing the defendant in such a case
to continue using the celebrity’s likeness may result in monetary detriment to
the celebrity, unjust enrichment of the defendant, and a decrease in incentive
for the plaintiff celebrity to continue creating. Id. However, if the defendant
is ordered to stop using the celebrity’s likeness, her expression is restricted by
the court—an arm of the government—which may be considered a violation of
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech or expression. Id.
50. Lee, supra note 19, at 479.
51. Id. at 479-80.
52. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003).
53. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal.
2001).
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fans, making the celebrity persona an “important avenue of
individual expression.”54 However, public figures often put a
vast amount of resources into developing their “prominence in a
particular field.”55 Years of work may be required before any
economic return on the investment is realized.56 “For some,
[this] investment may eventually create considerable
commercial value in one’s identity.”57
C. STRIKING A BALANCE
For decades, courts have struggled to find the appropriate
balance between a public figure’s right of publicity and the
First Amendment protection of the freedom of expression.
Courts have held that the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s
signature phrase58 and a robot designed to mimic the physical
appearance and usual activities of an actress were violations of
celebrities’ rights of publicity.59 Others have asserted that
marketing of an action figure with a resemblance to an actor’s
character60 and the sale of baseball cards featuring caricatures
of players and sarcastic commentary on their careers were
protected expression.61
The recent cases of Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.62
and Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,63
illustrate that the difficulties courts encounter in striking this
balance are still contemporary challenges. In Hoffman, Capital
54. Id.
55. Id. at 804.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th
Cir. 1983) (holding that Johnny Carson’s right of publicity was invaded by a
company’s use of his identity for commercial exploitation, even though his
name and likeness were not used).
59. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to reconsider a petition for rehearing of the panel holding that an
electronic robot that bore an uncanny similarity to Vanna White violated her
right of publicity).
60. See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 625-26 (6th
Cir. 2000) (holding that an actor did not show a violation of his right of
publicity by failing to establish that his persona had significant value or that
the action figure invoked his persona as separate from the character he
portrayed).
61. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d
959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that parody trading cards did not infringe
on players’ rights of publicity).
62. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
63. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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Cities Media used Dustin Hoffman’s 1982 movie character,
Sticking to the historic,
“Tootsie”, in a magazine.64
commercial/non-commercial distinction used by many courts,
the Ninth Circuit noted that “in context, the article as a whole
is a combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and
verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous actors.65
Any commercial aspects are ‘inextricably entwined’ with
expressive elements, and so they cannot be separated out ‘from
the fully protected whole.’”66 The court therefore held that
Capital Cities’ use of “Tootsie” was entitled to the full
protection under the First Amendment.67 In Comedy III, the
California Supreme Court similarly noted that the defendant’s
works were “non-commercial” for purposes of a First
Amendment analysis68 but used a far different approach to the
constitutional issue presented by defendant Saderup’s cartoon
drawings of the Three Stooges. The court stated the test for
determining whether an artist’s work is protected by the First
Amendment as follows:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on
the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond
that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic
labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist. On
the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative
elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment
protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic
interest protected by the right of publicity. . . . Accordingly, First
Amendment protection of such works outweighs whatever interest the
state may have in enforcing the right of publicity.69

Later in the opinion, the court stated that another way to
look at this test is to determine whether the celebrity’s image
was one of the “raw materials” from which the author created
the original work, or whether the image was an imitation that
constituted the very substance of the artist’s piece.70 The court
further emphasized that in applying this test, courts were “not
to be concerned with the quality of artistic contribution”, nor
64. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1180.
65. Id. at 1185.
66. Id. (citing Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & County of San
Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended).
67. Id. at 1189.
68. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 802 (stating that “the present case does not
concern commercial speech . . . Saderup’s portraits . . . are expressive works
and not an advertisement for or endorsement of a product”).
69. Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 809.
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were they to assume that a “literal depiction of a celebrity, even
if accomplished with great skill” would not be subject to
challenge.71
In addition, the Comedy III court added a second
“subsidiary inquiry”, intended to be helpful, but not
determinative, on the issue of whether the art had significant
“transformative elements” to allow it to be protected.72 The
“subsidiary inquiry” asked a court to consider the extent to
which the “marketability and economic value of the challenged
work derive[d] primarily from the fame of the celebrity
depicted.”73 Overall the court stated that the “transformative
elements” test was to be “quantitative [rather] than qualitative,
asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative
elements predominate[d] in the work.”74 The Comedy III court
went on to hold that the cartoon drawings in question violated
Comedy III’s right of publicity because it found “no significant
transformative or creative contribution” in them.75 While
admitting that Saderup had considerable skill, it stated that
this skill was “manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of
creating literal, conventional depictions of the Three Stooges so
as to exploit their fame”, and that “the marketability and
economic value of Saderup’s work” was derived from the fame
of the Three Stooges.76 Thus, for Saderup to continue using the
images, he would have to seek permission from Comedy III.77
D. SOLUTIONS
The “transformative elements” test espoused in Comedy III
has come under intense criticism. Some scholars argue that
the California Supreme Court failed to create a clear standard
by importing part of an “already confused” paradigm from
copyright law.78 In addition, such scholars believe that the
71. Id.
72. Id. at 810.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 811.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Pete Singer, Note, The Three Stooges Latest Act: Attempting to Define
the Scope of Protection the First Amendment Provides to Works of Art
Depicting Celebrities, Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 27 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 313, 322-25 (2002). Singer first attacks the “transformative
use” test of fair use in copyright law on the grounds that it is “both over and
under inclusive, allowing pure copying to constitute transformative use in
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court’s analysis leaves far too many questions unanswered and
will chill the creation of future artistic works.79 Others cite the
subsidiary prong as the major problem, since it may apply
differently to works depicting ordinary people as opposed to
celebrities and to works created by celebrity artists as opposed
to non-celebrity artists.80 Finally, the test has simply proven to
be too “vague to provide proper guidance” for some scholars.81
The critics of the “transformative elements” test have
provided a number of possible solutions to the problems of the
Comedy III decision. The first, the “Cultural Niche Theory of
Art” proposes a distinction between “Popular Art” and “Fine
Art”. Under this theory, “Fine Art” would be entitled to
transformative use status and its “concomitant First

some contexts, and over-protecting copyrighted works from seemingly
transformative uses in others.” Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted). Singer then
suggests the same problem will be imported into right of publicity
jurisprudence. Id. at 323-25 (a “parallel path will result in creating the same
problems of over-and under-protectiveness”).
79. See id. at 322-27. Singer argues against the “transformative use” test
by highlighting the questions that remain unanswered after the Comedy III
decision, such as “how does something become recognizably the artist’s own
work? . . . [W]hen does a work become more than a mere trivial variation?” Id.
at 325.
“When does a creative contribution or a significant creative
contribution occur? . . . [A]t what point do the creative elements of a celebrity
portraiture dominate the literal and imitative elements of the work?” Id. at
326. Singer argues that so many unanswered questions will chill freedom of
expression, thereby causing artists to hesitate to experiment with “creative
modes” since they will be afraid of possible liability. Id. at 328-30.
80. Gillison, supra note 19, at 380. Gillison argues that the greatest flaw
with the transformative elements test is that the second, “subsidiary” prong
rests on the celebrity status of the artist. Id. at 380. He states:
Just as in copyright infringement where it is irrelevant who infringes
on a person’s right of publicity, there is no exemption here for famous
people. The focus of copyright law is on the infringement itself . . .
[s]o too, with the right of publicity, the focus should not be on who
created the work, but rather the focus should be on the amount of the
source that has been appropriated, the nature and purpose of the
appropriation, the degree of transformation that has taken place, and
the extent to which the appropriation will detrimentally impact the
‘source’ celebrity.
Id. at 381 (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted). He also notes that in
creating the subsidiary test, the Comedy III court “lost sight of the fact that
anyone’s right of publicity can be infringed upon, even though only celebrities
will generally litigate this type of tort.” Id. Gillison maintains that through
the transformative elements test, “the court [now] requires the trier of fact to
define ‘celebrity.’” Id.
81. Peles, supra note 12, at 549-50 (“the court failed to create a clear test
to determine how much ‘social comment’ must be included in order to be
considered ‘transformative’”).
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Amendment protection”, but “Popular Art” would not.82
Another suggestion is simply to apply the entire “fair use”
standard used in copyright law to any right of publicity claim.83
A related proposal includes using a modified “fair use” standard
that emphasizes the possible economic harm to the celebrity.84
82. Singer, supra note 78, at 330-32.
Singer advocates Susan B.
Josephson’s “Cultural Niche Theory of Art” as an alternative to the
“transformative elements” test. Id. Under the theory, “popular art” will not
receive First Amendment protection, but “fine art” will. Id. at 333. “Popular
art” is work that “is not measured by its creativity.” Id. at 331.
Popular Art is very inexpensive compared to Fine Art and is
marketed in venues where the greatest number of people have access
to it. Many copies of the same image can be distributed, all of
relatively equal value because of its unoriginality or lack of
uniqueness. Popular Art tends to use images that are not new, that
have proven effective in the past, that are conventional and that are
familiar to people. Popular Art tends to lack a message or expression
and is generally ‘meant to entertain, to stimulate emotion, or project
sentimentality.’
Id. at 332 (footnotes omitted).
“Fine art” on the other hand, “is the result of the artist’s inspiration.” Id.
There is generally an original work and any copies “are either sanctioned
‘reprints’ or they are considered forgeries.” Id. at 334. According to this test,
Singer proffers that the decision in Comedy III would have been the same, but
the rationale would have been different:
[B]ecause the inherent qualities of some forms of Popular Art, as
defined by the Cultural Niche Theory, cause it to fall outside
transformative use and because Saderup’s depiction of the Three
Stooges can be categorized as Popular Art, the Comedy III court
correctly concluded that Saderup’s work was not transformative
according to the Culture Niche theory. Further, because original
works of Popular Art, such as The Three Stooges, require protection
from appropriation in order to maintain its economic value, the court
correctly decided to protect Comedy III’s right to the image of The
Three Stooges by denying Saderup’s work First Amendment
protection.
Id. at 336.
83. Gillison, supra note 19, at 383-84.
84. Peles, supra note 12, at 566. Peles suggests that a proper test for
drawing the line between the First Amendment and the right of publicity
should “separate economic and transformative elements.” Id. at 564. Such a
test would incorporate both the third and fourth “fair use” factors from
copyright law. Id. at 565-68. Copyright’s fourth fair use factor asks a court to
consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.” Id. at 565 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994)) (quotations
omitted).
Peles advocates using this question as a “determinative
consideration” in cases “where it is unclear whether a work is transformative,
such as with Saderup’s works [in Comedy III].” Id. at 566. The third fair use
factor, the functional test, asks if “regardless of medium, the defendant’s work,
though containing substantially similar material performs a different function
than that of the plaintiff’s.” Id. at 567 (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B][1] (2001)) (quotations
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Other possible solutions, proposed prior to the Comedy III
decision, include “balancing”, “relatedness”, and “alternative
means” approaches.85
omitted). Thus, the functional test “finds a use to be fair where its function
does not act as a market substitution for the original copyrighted work.” Id.
In a right of publicity case, this would cause a court to “lean towards fair use
where expressive elements within a defendant’s works cause consumers to
purchase those works primarily for the expression, and not the celebrity.” Id.
Such “[a]n economic consideration would further decipher whether the
infringing work performs the same function as the existing market created by
a celebrity.” Id.
85. See Lee, supra note 19, at 482-86, 496-98 (summarizing the various
approaches and noting their various strengths and weaknesses).
The ad hoc balancing test “weigh[s] competing expressive and property
interests according to unspecified criteria.” Id. at 485. This approach was
pioneered by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989), and was more recently used in Westchester Media v. PRL USA
Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 2000), and Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). Id. at 484-85 nn.93 & 98 and
accompanying text. However, there are four basic problems with such an
approach: (1) it is “arguably inconsistent with Supreme Court authority,”
which appears to support the “alternative means” test; (2) it is “ultimately
unsupported by authority,” since the original Rogers court “cite[d] no authority
to support the approach it develop[ed]”; (3) it is “not limited by any meaningful
evaluative guidelines or criteria, and amounts to little more than a Rorschach
test for a particular judge’s philosophical predilections”; and (4) it can “chill
speech by creating legal uncertainty as to whether the speech is or is not
permitted.” Id. at 485-86.
The relatedness test allows the use of publicity rights in expressive works if
“the rights ‘relate’ to the work, but not otherwise.” Id. at 496-97, quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, Reporter’s Note & cmts.
a & c (1993) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION]. Using a
deceased personality’s identity in “advertising, magazine or newspaper
articles, biographies, films, or similar works relating to the identified
individual is not an infringement of the right of publicity,” but “if the name or
likeness is used solely to attract attention to the work that is not related to the
identified person, the use may be subject to liability for the use of the other’s
identity in advertising.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION at §
47, Reporter’s Note & cmts. a & c) (quotations omitted). The Kentucky
Supreme Court using a relatedness test found there was “no right of publicity
violation from the use of a deceased musical performer’s name and likeness in
a music video for a song that was a tribute to the deceased musical performer.
Id. at 497 n.178 and accompanying text (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60
S.W.3d 524 (Ky. 2001)).
The alternative means test has not been adopted, but has “been discussed in
connection with right of publicity claims.” Id. at 498. The Tenth Circuit
applied the test, although overall the court “rejected the ‘adequate alternative
avenues’ approach in favor of ad hoc balancing.” Id. at 498 n.180 (citing
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971
(10th Cir. 1996)). Also called the “alternative means of communication” test, it
holds “non-commercial speech . . . infringing if there is another way to convey
the message without infringing intellectual property rights.” Id. at 482-83.
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E. A NEW STANDARD
Thus, by the time ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.86
was decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2003, the right of publicity
had already gone through a number of transformations and
interpretations, but remained uncertain.87 Starting out as an
amalgam of other rights, its justifications have been questioned
and, arguably, remain fairly weak. The tension between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment has continued to
cause strife in both the academic world and the courts.
According to the Comedy III decision, the “transformative
elements” test purportedly solved the issue of which standard
to apply when balancing the two rights.88 However, the test
was strongly criticized, and scholars subsequently advocated a
number of alternative options for striking a balance.89 In the
shadow of this scholarly debate, the parties in ETW faced an
uncertain outcome as they addressed the issue of whether Rick
Rush violated Tiger Woods’s right of publicity by creating and
selling the painting “The Masters of Augusta” in late 1998.90
II. ETW V. JIREH: “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS”
REEMERGE
To answer the question of whether Rick Rush violated
Tiger Woods’s right of publicity by creating and selling “The
Masters of Augusta,” the ETW court analyzed precedent from a
number of courts, including the Supreme Court, Federal Courts
Settling on the
of Appeals, and Ohio state courts.91
“transformative elements” test, it concluded that summary
judgment should be granted for Rick Rush and left ETW and
Tiger Woods without a claim on Rush’s proceeds from the
painting or his attendant rights as creator of that painting.92

While the Supreme Court may have supported this approach to reconcile
intellectual property rights with First Amendment rights, see id. at 484 (citing
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 438 U.S. 522
(1987)), no appellate court since 1987 has used the approach. Id.
86. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
87. See supra Part I.C-D.
88. See supra Part I.C.
89. See supra Part I.D.
90. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 918-19.
91. Id. at 928-36.
92. Id. at 936-38.
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A. THE FACTS
In 1997 Tiger Woods, “one of the world’s most famous
professional golfers,” became the youngest player ever to claim
a Masters victory.93 His win at Augusta National was made
even sweeter by the fact that he set a seventy-two hole record
for the tournament, and completed the event with a twelve
stroke lead over second place.94 Rick Rush, referred to as
“America’s sports artist”, commemorated the historic event in a
painting called “The Masters of Augusta”.95 Rush added the
painting to his collection of works featuring famous athletes
and great moments in sports.96 The painting had original and
expressive compositional elements. It featured Tiger Woods in
three poses:97 in the center image, he is swinging a golf club; on
the left and right, he is crouching to line up a putt with his
caddy observing.98 In the background Rush portrayed the
Augusta National Clubhouse, as well as famous golfers from
the past “looking down” on Woods99 with the Masters leader
board set behind their images.100 Jireh Publishing sold limited
edition prints of the painting in the form of fifty serigraphs and
five thousand lithographs.101 The serigraphs sold for $700
each, and the lithographs each sold for $100.102
ETW Corporation, the licensing agent of Tiger Woods,103
filed suit on June 26, 1998, in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio. The suit alleged, among
93. Id. at 918.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (including, for example, Michael Jordan, Mark McGuire, the
Pebble Beach Golf Tournament, and America’s Cup Yacht Race).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 918-19. The prints included Rush’s signature at the bottom
right hand corner. Id. The title of the work, “The Masters Of Augusta,”
appeared below the painting’s image, along with the words “Rick Rush” and
“Painting America Through Sports.” Id. at 918. Each limited edition print
was enclosed in a white envelope and included a photograph of Rush, a
description of his art, and a description of the painting itself. Id. The name
“Tiger Woods” appeared on the back of the envelope and is mentioned in the
description of the painting. Id. at 918-19.
102. Id. at 919.
103. Id. at 918. Tiger Woods is the Chairman of ETW’s board. Id. At the
time of the action, ETW had the exclusive right to exploit Woods’s name,
image, likeness, and signature, and all other publicity rights. Id.
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other things, that Jireh and Rush violated Woods’s right of
publicity under Ohio common law.104 Jireh counterclaimed,
seeking a declaratory judgment that Rush’s prints were
protected by the First Amendment.105 The parties promptly
moved for summary judgment.106 The district court granted
Jireh’s motion for summary judgment and then dismissed the
case.107 ETW appealed this decision.108
B. THE RESOLUTION
In order to determine whether the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on the Ohio state right of publicity claim
was proper, the Sixth Circuit first examined the right of
publicity generally.109 The court noted that the right of
publicity was a state law right that gave rise to “a cause of
action for the commercial tort of unfair competition.”110 It then
reviewed Ohio jurisprudence regarding the right of publicity,
including Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,111
which first recognized the right in Ohio.112 Noting that the
104. Id. at 919. ETW also alleged trademark infringement in violation of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; dilution of the mark under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c); unfair competition and false advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a);
unfair competition and deceptive trade practices under Ohio Revised Code §
4165.01; and unfair competition and trademark infringement under Ohio
common law. Id.
105. Id. Jireh also sought a declaratory judgment that the art prints did
not violate the Lanham Act. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub. Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio
2000)).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 928-36.
110. Id. at 928.
111. 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562
(1976) (recognizing a common law “right of publicity” in Ohio).
112. ETW, 332 F.3d at 929. In Zacchini, the Defendant videotaped and
broadcast the Plaintiff’s human cannonball act. Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 455.
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized a common law right of publicity in Ohio.
See id. at 460. But the court ultimately held that Zacchini’s right was
trumped by the news service’s First Amendment right. See id. at 461-62
(holding that the newscast was “a matter of legitimate public interest”). The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court on other
grounds. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79
(1977) (holding that the First Amendment did not require privileging the press
where the public was not otherwise deprived of the performance in a
commercial setting). But the Court upheld Ohio’s state right of publicity. Id.
at 576. Zacchini is the only United States Supreme Court decision dealing
with the right of publicity. ETW, 332 F.3d at 929.
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Ohio Supreme Court had relied heavily on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts’ formulation of the right of publicity as a
branch of the right of privacy,113 the ETW court introduced the
modern version of the right of publicity reformulated in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as a right to the
commercial value of a person’s identity.114 The court critically
examined the rationales for a commercial basis for the right of
publicity115 and found a limited right, constrained by the
public’s interest in expression.116 However, the ETW court
found that the Ohio courts would probably “follow the
principles of the Restatement in defining the limits of the right
of publicity” and that the Ohio Supreme Court was “inclined to
give substantial weight to the public interest in freedom of
expression when balancing it against the personal and
proprietary interests recognized by the right of publicity.”117
The court then examined circuit court cases regarding the right

In addition to the Zacchini decision, the court in ETW looked at Vinci v.
American Can Co., 459 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1984) (reaffirming the right of
publicity); Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 372 N.E.2d 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that a plaintiff’s right of publicity was violated when the defendant
represented and presented plaintiff’s research paper as his own at an
American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutic conference); and
Parma Int’l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89CA004573, 1990 WL 11716 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 7, 1990) (denying summary judgment to a defendant whether he had used
the plaintiff’s name and likeness on product packaging and in advertising
information when the plaintiff was no longer employed by the defendant). See
ETW, 332 F.3d at 929-33.
113. The right of publicity was included in the Restatement in the chapter
“Invasion of Privacy”. Id. at 930. The ETW court noted that the court in
Zacchini “quoted the entire text of § 652 (C) of the Restatement, as well as
comments a, b, c, and d.” Id.
114. “In 1995, the American Law Institute transferred its exposition of the
right of publicity to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition . . . in a
chapter entitled ‘Appropriation of Trade Values.’” Id. The current version
defines the right of publicity as, “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value
of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability.” Id. at 930
(quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION supra note 85, § 46 (n.d.)).
115. Such rationales are “generally less compelling than those that justify
rights in trademarks or trade secrets.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 85, § 46, cmt. c (n.d.)).
116. The right of publicity is “fundamentally constrained by the public and
constitutional interest in freedom of expression,” but not “if the name or
likeness is used solely to attract attention to work that is not related to the
identified person.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra
note 85, § 47, cmt. c (n.d.)).
117. ETW, 332 F.3d at 931.
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of publicity,118 focusing heavily on the Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. decision.119
Based on this extensive discussion, the court set forth the
rules it would follow when analyzing the case at bar. It
concluded that “in deciding whether the sale of Rush’s prints
violate Woods’s right of publicity, [it would] look to the Ohio
case law and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition.”120 “In deciding where the line should be drawn
between Woods’s intellectual property rights and the First
Amendment”, the court stated that it would follow the
dissenting opinion in White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.,121 the Tenth Circuit decision in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Association,122 and the Ninth Circuit
decision in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.123 to determine
whether “The Masters of Augusta” was protected by the First
Amendment.124 Finally, the court stated that it believed the
“transformative elements test adopted by the Supreme Court of
California” in Comedy III was appropriate for determining
where the “proper balance l[ay] between the First Amendment
and Woods’s intellectual property rights.”125
118. The court looked at Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a “right of publicity” is not
inheritable and so the deceased’s assignee was not able to enjoin a statute
created in the deceased’s likeness); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that Johnny Carson’s right of
publicity was invaded by a company’s use of his identity for commercial
exploitation, even though his name and likeness were not used); White v.
Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to
reconsider a petition for rehearing of the panel holding that an electronic robot
who bore an uncanny similarity to Vanna White violated her “right of
publicity”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d
959 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that parody trading cards didn’t infringe on
players’ “rights of publicity”); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d
1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a magazine’s use of a photo of Hoffman
digitally altered to create an image of him wearing a designer’s brand of
clothing was not pure commercial speech and so was entitled to full protection
of the First Amendment; thus, it did not violate Hoffman’s “right of publicity”);
and Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001) (creating the “transformative elements” test). ETW, 332 F.3d at 931-36.
119. ETW, 332 F.3d at 934-36 (discussing Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001)).
120. Id. at 936.
121. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
122. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1995).
123. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
124. ETW, 332 F.3d at 936.
125. Id.
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Applying these principles to Rush’s work itself, the court
first stated that “[t]he evidence in the record reveals that
Rush’s work consists of much more than a mere literal likeness
of Woods”, and that the artistic elements in the work were
enough to entitle Rush’s work to First Amendment
protection.126 Next, applying the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, the ETW court concluded that “Rush’s work has
substantial informational and creative content which
outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s market.”127 Further
finding that Rush’s work was “entitled to the full protection of
the First Amendment”,128 the court used the balancing test
employed by Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Association129 to conclude that the degree of the restriction on
speech in this case was greater than Woods’s intellectual
property right, since “Woods, like most sports and
entertainment celebrities with commercially valuable
identities” would “still be able to reap substantial financial
rewards from authorized appearances and endorsements”, even
without the right of publicity.130 “It is not at all clear”, the
court stated, “that the appearance of Woods’s likeness in
artwork prints which display one of his major achievements
will reduce the commercial value of his likeness.”131 By
contrast, Rush supplemented Woods’s identity with an
important creative contribution of his own; by refusing Rush
protection, the court would “extinguish [his] right to profit from
his creative enterprise.”132
Finally, turning to the transformative elements test used
in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,133 the
court found that:
Rush’s work does contain significant transformative elements which
make it especially worthy of First Amendment protection and also
less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by
Woods’s right of publicity.
Unlike the unadorned, nearly

126. Id. The court poetically noted that “[a] piece of art that portrays a
historic sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture
attaches to such events. It would be ironic indeed if the presence of the image
of the victorious athlete would deny the work First Amendment protection.”
Id.
127. Id. at 937.
128. Id.
129. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
130. ETW, 332 F.3d at 937-38
131. Id. at 938.
132. Id.
133. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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photographic reproduction of the faces of The Three Stooges in
Comedy III, Rush’s work does not capitalize solely on a literal
depiction of Woods. Rather, Rush’s work consists of a collage of
images in addition to Woods’s image which are combined to describe,
in artistic form, a historic event in sports history and to convey a
message about the significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.
Because Rush’s work has substantial transformative elements, it is
entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. In this case,
we find that Woods’s right of publicity must yield to the First
Amendment.134

Based on these conclusions, the court affirmed summary
judgment to Jireh Publishing.135
III. THE “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” TEST IS A
WORKABLE SOLUTION
Despite the criticism of the “transformative elements” test
established in Comedy III, the test is essentially workable for
three reasons: (1) it strikes a correct balance between the right
of publicity and First Amendment rights; (2) it allows courts to
make necessary fact specific determinations; and (3) other
alternative approaches do not offer any improvements; on the
contrary, they may be even more faulty. However, it is likely
that the confusing and disjointed nature of the ETW decision
will be used as proof that the “transformative elements” test
should not be applied by future courts. Yet the “transformative
elements” test is not to blame for the weaknesses of the ETW
decision: poor organization, the failure to address the issues
raised, and a lack of sufficient guidance regarding the
definition of the Ohio right of publicity are at fault. By
following a clear cut, step by step approach, the ETW court
could have avoided these pitfalls and focused on a more
thorough
examination
of
Rush’s
work
under
the
“transformative elements” test. Future courts can do the same
and in the process provide better insight into the true strengths
and weaknesses of the “transformative elements” test.
A. THE “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” TEST ESTABLISHED IN
COMEDY III IS ESSENTIALLY WORKABLE
While the “transformative elements” test established in
Comedy III has been heavily criticized, it is essentially
workable. Not only does the test strike the appropriate balance
between the celebrity’s interests and artist’s rights, but it
134. ETW, 332 F.3d at 938.
135. Id.
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leaves room for courts to make the fact specific determinations
necessary to ensure fair results in unavoidably subjective
decisions. In addition, the alternatives proposed up to this
point do not offer realistic suggestions for either increasing
clarity or decreasing subjectivity in court decisions; nor do they
address the significant economic benefits that celebrities
receive from some unauthorized use of their identities.
Together, these three reasons provide sufficient justification for
applying the “transformative elements” test to cases, such as
Comedy III and ETW, where the right of publicity intersects
with the First Amendment.
1. The “Transformative Elements” Test Strikes the Right
Balance
Considering the questionable strength of the rationales for
a right of publicity,136 the Comedy III court struck the correct
balance between a celebrity’s right of publicity and an artist’s
First Amendment rights when formulating the “transformative
elements” test. A celebrity’s right of publicity is primarily
based on economic justifications.137 How much their economic
interests, and thus their publicity rights, should be protected
should be premised on how important economic incentives are
While one can hardly discount the
to the celebrity.138
significant investment a celebrity makes in herself, “fame preexisted the right of publicity and no one apparently needed the
law’s protection to become famous before this century.”139 In
addition, it is likely that some unauthorized use of a celebrity’s
identity increases, rather than decreases, the celebrity’s
Concerns about “over exploitation” and “unjust
value.140
enrichment” only become relevant when an artist’s or author’s
use of the celebrity’s identity misappropriates or directly
competes with the celebrity’s own use, “without being

136. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
138. In de Grandpré, supra note 27, de Grandpré asserts that the current
rules governing a right of publicity are overbroad, and that “efficient rules of
right of publicity infringement should prevent the over-exploitation of
celebrity identity while at the same time encouraging communicative uses
that produce greater positive externalities than negative ones.” Id. at 108.
This comment suggests that the “transformative elements” test fulfills Mr. de
Grandpré’s requirements.
139. de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 103.
140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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transformative.”141
The “transformative elements” test recognizes this by
narrowing the number of situations in which a celebrity can
claim a violation of the right of publicity. While the first prong
of the test focuses on the artistic elements of a work, the
“subsidiary prong” expressly urges that a court take account of
the economic justifications for the right of publicity.142 In doing
so, the test preserves the right of a celebrity to receive
compensation if an artist simply takes a celebrity’s identity and
uses it without contributing more than “trivial” artistic content
or ideas, where the artist’s “creativity, skill, and reputation”143
do not add to the work. In such a case, the bare use of the
celebrity’s investment without any additional contribution
amounts to almost a taking, since it is the celebrity’s
investment alone that is being used. People viewing and
buying the artwork will tire of the celebrity more quickly, since
the only thing being portrayed in the artwork is the celebrity
himself.
By contrast, an artist who has met the celebrity’s
investment with his or her own contribution by adding
expression separate from the celebrity’s identity is protected
under the “transformative elements” test. Considering the
questionable economic justifications for the right to publicity,
this result seems to be fair. It is less likely that artists who
141. See de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 116-17. de Grandpré suggests that
an efficient right of publicity would “prohibit unauthorized uses of identity
that harm it—that result in net negative externalities—but would allow
unauthorized uses that result in net positive externalities—informative or
recoding uses, for example.” Id. at 114. The most inefficient uses of publicity
are “[u]nauthorized deceptive uses of persona . . . [since they] have no social
value and cause significant injury to a celebrity, especially if she has already
endorsed goods or services in related markets.” Id. at 117. “[U]ses of persona
in circumstances that are shocking or repulsive also result in near immediate
harm, and should be considered deceptive” and violative of a right of publicity.
Id. In addition, “unauthorized reproductions of performances [should] also
remain right of publicity infringements because they directly compete with a
performer’s business, while the social benefit of copied performances is limited
if the defendant does not improve on the plaintiff’s act.” Id. By contrast, “uses
that trigger curiosity rather than fatigue usually do not result in congestion
externalities. Id. at 117-18. Moreover, informative uses often entail high
transaction costs because it is notoriously difficult to make consumers pay for
the information” Id.
142. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal.
2001) (stating that “courts may find useful a subsidiary inquiry, particularly
in close cases: does the marketability and economic value of the challenged
work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?”).
143. Id.
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incorporate more than “trivial” content or ideas will be unjustly
enriched, since they have had to make an investment in the
artwork as well, whether it is through their own thoughts,
talents, or “reputation” as an artist. In fact, the artist’s effort
may even unjustly enrich the celebrity. It is entirely possible
that the artist’s use of the celebrity’s identity will increase,
rather than decrease, the popularity of the celebrity by adding
to the number of people who recognize the celebrity and what
he or she does.144 In addition, a celebrity whose personal
identity plays a minor role in a piece of artwork should not be
as concerned about over-exploitation, since it is as likely that
someone will purchase the artwork for the art itself as it is that
he or she will purchase the art for the celebrity image thereon.
Thus, any economic incentives the celebrity has to perform or
create are not threatened by the use of his or her identity in
such a situation.
2. The “Transformative Elements” Test Allows for a FactSpecific Inquiry
Cases dealing with art, music, and related pursuits are
inevitably unique and fact-intensive. The “transformative
elements” test provides a workable solution in such cases
because it allows courts to make case-by-case determinations
on the contribution(s) of authors to the specific piece of art at
issue.
While the test implicates a minimal amount of
subjectivity, such subjectivity is unavoidable and not
necessarily undesirable. In fact, it may enhance the quality of
court decisions by avoiding the confusion and possible
unfairness that could result from bright line rules that attempt
to squeeze diverse fact situations into the same, ill-fitting
mold.145
While
some
commentators
have
criticized
the
“transformative elements” test for being too vague146 and
allowing too much subjectivity in judgment,147 this subjectivity

144. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
145. It is almost impossible to use a one-size-fits-all objective standard to
judge such diverse works as paintings, sculptures, television and radios
advertisements, web pages, etc. Our recent experience in attempting to merge
new internet technology into the existing statutory regime (both in copyright
and patent law) is just one example of the difficulties inherent in attempting
to reconcile diverse forms of creativity under the same standards.
146. Peles, supra note 12, at 549.
147. See supra text accompanying note 79.
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is probably an inevitable result, considering the subject matter
to which the test is applied. Courts have attempted to make socalled “objective” decisions in cases involving artwork for
decades, with mixed results.148 Judges and juries have tastes,
preferences, and opinions. Art appeals to these different tastes,
preferences, and opinions in different ways. Instead of hiding
behind a bright line rule with an illusory promise of objectivity,
the “transformative elements” test rightly recognizes that that
a minimal amount of subjective judgment will be involved in
court cases involving art, music, writing and related pursuits.
It puts the parties on notice that a court will be considering
whether an artist has contributed something other than just a
literal depiction of a celebrity to the world of art.
Related is the idea that art depicting celebrities comes in
many forms.
Likewise, the “expression” that adds a
“transformative element” to the art can take many forms. The
“transformative elements” test recognizes these differences by
leaving the definition of “transformative elements” open so that
future courts will be able to tailor its meaning to the facts of
It is hardly unwise to do so,
each individual case.149
considering that art and its “elements” can encompass an
infinite type and amount of expression limited only by the
148. Such difficulties have occurred in reference to the determination of
originality, a constitutional prerequisite to protection in copyright law.
Compare Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1984)
(stating that a photograph of Oscar Wilde is a “useful, new, harmonious,
characteristic, and graceful picture, and that said plaintiff made the same . . .
entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form
by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera” and therefore holding
that the photograph was “an original work of art, the product of plaintiff’s
intellectual invention” for which copyright protection was available and
violated in this case) with Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (stating that “‘[o]riginal’ in reference to a
copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to the
‘author.’ No large measure of novelty is necessary”); and Bridgeman Art
Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating
that “‘slavish copying,’ although doubtless requiring technical effort, does not”
entitle a work to copyright protection); and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that “[o]riginal, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied form other works), and that it
possess at least some minimal degree of creativity”).
149. Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). The Comedy III court
emphasized that “transformative elements or creative contributions that
require First Amendment protection are not confined to parody and can take
many forms, from factual reporting . . . to fictionalized portrayal . . . to subtle
social criticism [citations omitted].” Id.
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imagination of the human mind. In doing so, the test avoids
the unfairness that could result if it set forth specific factors or
requirements that would be binding on future courts. Since the
world of art is incredibly diverse, it is likely that any test that
places artwork into categories, or subjects it to specific
requirements, or requires that it meet certain factors, thereby
preventing a court from delving into the content of the art,
would itself cause unfair results.
Traditionally, however, the fear of integrating subjectivity
into court decisions has, at least on the surface, caused courts
to staunchly oppose standards that recognize the use of any
subjective judgments.150 However, there is nothing inherently
wrong with making subjective judgments; judges and juries
make them often.151 What is dangerous is failing to recognize
150. The most famous opinion cited in support of this idea is that of Justice
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). The
“Bleistein Non Discrimination Principle” was stated in the copyright
infringement case as such:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet
if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial
value- it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value- and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
151. See Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a “Question of
Law” or a “Question of Fact?”: The Fact Solution, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 181, 185-86 (1999) (stating that “[c]ourts have wrestled with defining and
measuring creativity, usually with little success, for over hundred years.
Several specialized approaches have emerged, all of which are extremely
subjective”).
Reytblat explains these specialized approaches, which
correspond to different types of protected works. The first approach is the
Feist test for evaluating originality in compilations. Feist requires that there
be a “collection of pre existing material facts or data,” that “the data must be
selected, coordinated or arranged,” and that “by virtue of such selection,
coordination, or arrangement, an original work of authorship must be
created.” Id. at 187-88. While the court in Feist did not list the types of
organization that would pass the creativity test, according to Reytblat, “it did
say that the structure chosen must be a product of choice that reflects ‘the
existence of . . . intellectual production, of thought, and conception.’” Id. at
188 (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S.
340, 348, 362 (1991)). The second area Reytblat looks at is “derivative works.”
In this area a court must decide whether the “quantity and quality of the
author’s contributions” constitute “sufficient minimal creativity to merit
copyright protection.” Id. at 190. To determine this, courts often use the
“distinguishable variation” test, in which “an author claiming ownership of a
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subjectivity and appropriately constraining it.152 As set forth
by the Comedy III court, the “transformative elements” test is
appropriately constrained: courts are “not to be concerned with
the quality of the artistic contribution—vulgar forms of
expression fully qualify for First Amendment protection”153 and
the “inquiry is [intended to be] more quantitative than
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the
creative elements predominate in the work.”154 The “subsidiary
inquiry” constrains judgment even further, asking courts to
consider “in close cases” where the “economic value of the
challenged work derive[s] . . . from.”155 While none of these
valid copyright in a derivative work must point out the variations he has
made, and then allow the court to determine if those variations are
‘distinguishable,’ rather than ‘merely trivial.’” Id. at 191 (citing Russ
VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 846 (1993)).
Finally, Reytblat explains a test relied on by Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg in
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) to “measure
creativity in truly ‘original’ works of authorship, those that are neither
derivative works nor compilations.” Id. at 192. Reytblat states that Ginsburg
“relied upon an instinctive or subjective judgment of a work, based on one’s
experience of the world” in finding that the “selection and rearrangement of
common shapes demonstrated a minimal element of ingenuity heretofore
unseen” and so gave Atari copyright in its video game “Breakout.” Id. at 19394. The district court had held that the Register of Copyrights was correct in
refusing to register the game because of lack of originality, since the game
“consisted of nothing more than an aggregation of common geometric shapes
and colors.” Id. at 193 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883
(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
Reytblat further states that “originality is inexorably linked to the communal
perception of what is artistic, imaginative or inventive.” Id. at 196. This
carries over into other areas of the law: “like originality, these three issues
[trademark infringement, the “reasonableness of conduct in tort law,” and
“[s]ubstantial similarity in copyright law”] are invariably subjective and are
firmly tied to community standards, to what the community views as being
reasonable, confusing, or pilfered. These determinations call for subjective
judgments based on peoples’ experiences and perceptions of the world.” Id. at
197.
It should be noted that Reytblat argues that because judgments in copyright
law and other areas of intellectual property are so subjective, they should be
left to juries, not judges. This comment reserves judgment on that issue for
other researchers and only notes that Reytblat’s arguments support the idea
that judges and juries are called on to make subjective judgments regularly.
152. If one relies on the belief that courts are making entirely objective
determinations, it is likely that he or she will fail to set boundaries to
constrain that judgment. By recognizing the fact that all judgments are
inherently subjective, one can tie in factors that guide a court’s judgment in
order to increase predictability and consistency.
153. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 810.
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considerations will provide a rule that allows parties to
determine their fate with one hundred percent accuracy, they
do ensure that judges and juries cannot make determinations
based on their personal opinions of the artist, artwork, or
celebrity.
3. Alternative Tests Do Not Provide Appropriate Substitutes
Two main alternatives to the “transformative elements”
test have been proposed: the Cultural Niche Theory of Art and
the copyright “Fair Use” defense.156 While each of these tests
has their benefits, neither is an appropriate substitute for the
“transformative elements” test.
a. The Cultural Niche Theory of Art
The Cultural Niche Theory of Art is not an appropriate
substitute for the “transformative elements” test because it
fails to eliminate the subjectivity. In addition, while the
“transformative elements” test recognizes the relatively weak
economic justifications behind the right of publicity, the
Cultural Niche Theory of Art dispenses with them altogether,
creating a situation where the most egregious violations of
celebrities’ economic rights may go un-remedied, while small
ones may be punished.
Proponents of the Cultural Niche Theory assert that the
test removes some of the subjectivity of the “transformative
elements” test by placing works into either the “Popular Art”
category or the “Fine Art” category, with protection being given
to “Fine Art.”157 However, upon close examination, one comes
to the realization that the line between what is “Popular Art”
and “Fine Art” is blurred and subjective as well. For example,
the Cultural Niche Theory asks the finder of fact to determine
whether a work’s purpose is to “entertain, to stimulate emotion
or project sentimentality” (evidence suggesting “Popular Art”)
or to “exhibit a personal expression, originality, [or] creativity”
(evidence suggesting “Fine Art”).158 First and foremost, it
seems that the two categories are not mutually exclusive. In
addition, one must ask how judges and juries can be expected
to make such a decision without consulting their own ideas
about
entertainment,
emotion,
and
sentimentality.
156. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying note 82.
158. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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Furthermore, the Cultural Niche Theory requires the fact
finder to classify something as “Popular Art” based on what is
“conventional” or “familiar”.159 This classification, as well,
ultimately depends on what is “conventional” or “familiar” to a
particular person and necessarily requires judges and juries to
consult their own ideas and opinions.
Since it fails to recognize the subjectivity inherent in these
questions, the Cultural Niche Theory fails to constrain it.160
The Cultural Niche Theory invites judges and juries to decide
what “entertains” or is “familiar” to them, without setting
guidelines regarding offensive materials or suggesting
additional factors that may be considered in borderline cases.
Thus, the Cultural Niche Theory may actually be more
subjective and possibly more dangerous than the
“transformative elements” test.
The Cultural Niche Theory is also faulty because it may
protect art that significantly infringes on a celebrity’s economic
right, but condemn art that results in only minimal conversion.
This discrepancy completely ignores the unjust enrichment
justification behind the right of publicity. If an artist created a
one-of-a-kind, original painting depicting the exact replica of a
celebrity, for example—a president, and sold it at an art sale
for one million dollars, the work would be fully protected if the
distinction between “Fine Art” and “Popular Art” is applied as
suggested.161 However, if the artist created a small playing
card out of this same painting and then made and sold 50,000
copies for one dollar each, the playing cards would be
considered “Popular Art” and thus not protected.162 While the
159. See supra text accompanying note 82.
160. See supra text accompanying note 82.
161. Under the characteristics of “fine art”, noted supra text accompanying
note 82, a realistic painting of the president’s likeness is likely to be
considered “fine art.” In his article, The Three Stooges Latest Act: Attempting
to Define the Scope of Protection the First Amendment provides to Works of Art
Depicting Celebrities, Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., Singer
uses the example of the Mona Lisa to illustrate fine art. See Singer, supra
note 78. The Mona Lisa is a work of “fine art,” he states, because its value
“arguably lies in its aesthetic form, its expression, its creative uniqueness or
its appeal to intellect and reason of the mind. Id. More importantly, the
Mona Lisa is valued as an original, one-of-a-kind work of Fine Art.” Id. at 334.
A similar, expensive, one of a kind portrait of the president could be
considered analogous.
162. Under the characteristics of “popular art”, noted supra text
accompanying note 82, such an item would almost certainly be considered
popular art, since playing cards are inexpensive, marketed in venues where
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celebrity may suffer greater damage in the form of overexposure via the 50,000 playing cards, the case for preventing
unjust enrichment of the artist would be much greater with the
one-of-a-kind original painting.163 Arguably, this creates an
unfair result for both the celebrity, who suffers greater damage
from the protected work, and the artist, whose small-scale work
is prejudiced by the fact that it appeals to a number of people
whose art budget is limited to a one dollar playing card.
The “transformative elements” test avoids this problem by
premising the distinction between protected and unprotected
expression on the subject of the art itself and then considering
where the economic value of the artwork comes from.164 In our
example above, the artist will be prevented from being unjustly
enriched, since the test ensures that the artist has contributed
something to the work and that the value of the work is not
the greatest number of people have access to them, and many copies of them
can be distributed, all of relatively equal value because of their unoriginality
or lack of uniqueness.
163. Hypothetically, more people would undoubtedly have access to seeing
and obtaining a playing card than a one-of-a-kind million dollar painting.
However, if we assume that the celebrity would ask for a twenty five percent
cut on all the earnings of either type of artwork, the one of a kind, original
work protected by the Cultural Niche theory is doing the greatest damage to
the celebrity economically by denying him or her this cut. Furthermore, if the
painting is famous enough, it is possible that potential for over-exposure could
even be greater with the one-of-a-kind painting than with the playing cards.
164. Recall that the test requests a court to consider whether “the celebrity
likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very
sum and substance of the work in question . . . whether a product containing a
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.” Comedy III
Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). A court is then
requested to consider whether the “marketability and economic value of the
challenged work derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted.”
Id. at 810. Under this test, one cannot be sure whether a court would protect
the one-of-a-kind painting, but under the marketability prong, if the large
economic value of this painting is due to the celebrity’s own fame, it would go
against the idea that the painting should be protected by the First
Amendment. This gives greater protection to a celebrity whose rights have
truly been infringed, since a celebrity can suffer economic loss from either
expensive or inexpensive items. Likewise, one cannot be sure that a court
would not protect the playing cards; yet, again, under the marketability and
economic value prong, a court must determine whether the value of the cards
is rightfully due to the celebrity. The fine art/popular art test, by placing so
much emphasis on the expense and venue of the art, misses the factor that
matters most: whether the celebrity is due part of the proceeds from the item;
whether expensive or inexpensive; in a museum or a convenience store;
because he or she is the reason the article is of value.
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solely due to the celebrity’s fame. The expense and distribution
of the work makes no difference; it is the content of the work
itself that matters.
b. Copyright’s Fair Use Defense
Scholars have also suggested that importing the entire fair
use defense from copyright law will provide a more clear and
predictable test in right of publicity cases. However, “the
factors used in copyright analysis do not readily lend
themselves to right of publicity” claims165 and might result in
overprotecting a celebrity’s right of publicity.
The first major problem with using the fair use factors is
that right of publicity does not correctly fit the paradigm. As
Mark Lee notes:
[The first] copyright fair use factor[], the ‘nature of the copyrighted
work,’ would generally not be helpful in right of publicity analysis
because the identity rights involved would usually be of the same
‘nature.’ Another factor, ‘the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,’ also would not
generally be meaningful, since by definition there must be a taking of
an individual’s identity before right of publicity liability attaches. A
third factor, ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work,’ would routinely favor a finding of
infringement, as Supreme Court authority establishes that an
uncompensated taking will generally have an adverse effect on the
market for commercial exploitation of the celebrity’s image.166

Lee highlights the second major problem with using the
fair use standard in right of publicity cases: the third factor in
the fair use standard will almost always fall in favor of finding
a violation of a right to publicity.167 Since one factor is almost
certainly determined against artists from the outset, they face
what is effectively a presumption of infringement. Yet tipping
the balance against the artists does not make sense. Not only
are they arguably asserting the more important right in such
cases, the First Amendment right, but the “presumption” fails
to take account of an important difference between the right of
publicity and copyright. While copyrights are limited in
duration, many courts have held that the right of publicity
exists posthumously and is both inheritable and devisable,
without regard to time limits.168 In order to preserve the
balance between the right of the artist and the original author
165.
166.
167.
168.

Lee, supra note 19, at 492.
Id.
See id.
62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 25 (2003).
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or celebrity, it would seem that the right of publicity should
have broader exceptions than the fair use defense permits in
copyright to offset the greater temporal protection it offers. Yet
by simply applying the fair use factors to the right of publicity,
one is narrowing the scope of the right without compensating
for the fact that the right of the celebrity likely exists in
perpetuity.
The “transformative elements” test adopted in Comedy III
is thus workable. The test appropriately balances the right of
publicity and the First Amendment, and allows courts the
flexibility to make necessary fact specific determinations.
Furthermore, the main alternatives to the test do not hold up
under scrutiny. Yet the future of the “transformative elements”
test depends on the ability of courts to correctly apply it. As
noted below, for the ETW court, the application of this
workable standard appeared to be a challenge.
B. THE ETW V. JIREH DECISION THREATENS THE FUTURE
APPLICABILITY OF THE “TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS” TEST
The Sixth Circuit, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing,
Inc.,169 was the next court to utilize the “transformative
elements” test after the Comedy III decision. While the
“transformative elements” test is essentially workable, a person
reading the ETW decision may have serious doubts about the
standard’s future. A closer look, however, reveals that it is not
the test itself that makes the ETW decision confusing and
unclear. The ETW court, while ultimately reaching a correct
decision, encountered a number of problems when attempting
to explain its reasoning. First and foremost, the very structure
of the analysis does not lend itself easily to clarity.170 Second,
the court appears to break the right of publicity decision into
three inquiries, but it fails to directly address the issues it
presents. Third, the court’s analysis was made more difficult
by the fact that it was working with common law, not a broad
Finally, incorporating the
statute as in Comedy III.171
comments accompanying a Restatement in its right of publicity
definition led the court to overlook the fact that the
“transformative elements” test was intended to be an

169. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
170. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
171. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
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affirmative defense.172
These four problems, not the
“transformative elements” test, are what complicated a fairly
straightforward decision. By clarifying the structure of the
decision, addressing the major issues it set out to analyze, and
abandoning the Restatement comments as part of the Ohio
right of publicity, the court could have avoided considerable
confusion and focused instead on a clear, concise analysis under
the “transformative elements” test. The ETW decision perhaps
then could have provided better guidance to future courts on
how to apply the “transformative elements” test and given
future courts and litigants a more accurate picture of the test’s
true value.173
1. The ETW v. Jireh Decision Regarding the Right of Publicity
Is Confusing and Unclear, But This Confusion Is Not Due to
the “Transformative Elements” Test
In reading the Court’s right of publicity decision in ETW,
one can spot four major problems: the court uses an
inappropriate structure to tackle the problem, it fails to answer
the questions it asks, the necessary use of Ohio common law, as
opposed to statutory law, made the analysis more complex, and
the court’s use of the Restatement and accompanying
comments to determine whether Woods had a right of publicity
led it to ignore the fact that the “transformative elements” test
was intended to be an affirmative defense.
a. The Structure of the Court’s Analysis Was Inappropriate
In dealing with the numerous claims brought by ETW in
this case, the Sixth Circuit attempted to separate them into
logical categories for explanation and analysis. Under section
IV, titled “Lanham Act Unfair Competition and False
Endorsement Claims, Ohio’s Right to Privacy Claims, and the
First Amendment Defense”, the court first talked about First
Amendment defenses in general, quickly analyzed whether the
First Amendment applies to Rush’s work, and then explained
the Lanham Act claims and right of publicity claims, all in
separate, clearly labeled sections.174 It then attempted to apply

172. See infra Part III.B.1.d.
173. See infra Part III.B.2.
174. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924-36 (6th Cir.
2003).
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the law that it just explained in one large section.175 The court
moved with lightning speed from the Lanham Act claim to the
right of publicity claim and mixed more First Amendment
application in with each.176
This structure leads to considerable confusion. The court
painstakingly explained the law in each area but then failed to
apply it as carefully. The decision reads as if the court
suddenly became tired of thinking about the issues and
uncomfortably penned a string of conclusions as fast as possible
to get rid of the case. By using cases and analysis from the
right of publicity explanation in the Lanham Act analysis, and
vice versa, the reader begins to wonder just where the
application of Lanham Act principles ends and the application
The First
of the right of publicity principles begins.177
Amendment defense explanation and short application at the
beginning of the decision178 and then subsequent application of
the First Amendment defense intermittently throughout the
Lanham Act and right of publicity analyses179 leaves the reader
confused about which First Amendment principles apply to the
facts. This frustrates the reader and fails to separate clearly
the important issues implicated by the right of publicity long
before the “transformative elements” test is applied.
b. The Court Fails to Address the Issues It Poses
The second major problem with the ETW v. Jireh decision
is that the court fails to answer directly the questions it asks.
The ETW court appears to be attempting to break the right of
publicity issue into three basic inquiries: (1) Was Woods’s right
of publicity violated?; (2) If so, does the First Amendment apply
to Rush’s painting?; and finally (3) If the First Amendment
does apply, do Rush’s First Amendment rights trump Woods’s
right of publicity under the “transformative elements” test?180
The substance and order of these questions is logical. The
Comedy III court intended the “transformative elements” test
to be an affirmative defense,181 so it only makes sense that a
175. See id. at 936-38.
176. See id. at 924-38.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 924-25.
179. See id. at 925-36.
180. See id. at 936.
181. See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810
(Cal. 2001) (“In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge
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court first ask whether there was actually a violation, second
consider whether a First Amendment defense is available at
all, and finally take that defense and apply it to the facts at
hand.
However, the court does not directly discuss the answers to
these questions but engages in a prolonged discussion of
balancing, precedent, and other tangential issues. As the
dissent notes, “it appears that the majority engages in three
separate analyses, and arrives at three separate holdings,
although all of which reach the same result”182 and does so
independently of one another. The first conclusion the court
draws is that Rush’s work does not violate Woods’s right of
publicity since “Rush’s work has substantial informational and
creative content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s
market.”183 The court then goes on to discuss whether the First
Amendment applies to Rush’s work.184 Yet this question is
already answered in the preliminary discussion about First
Amendment defenses when the court stated “Rush’s prints are
not commercial speech. They do not propose a commercial
transaction.
Accordingly, they are entitled to the full
protection of the First Amendment.”185 Instead of simply
stating this concept, the court discusses the balance between
the restriction placed on Rush and the interest of Woods.186 At
this point, one begins to question the purpose of the prior First
Amendment discussion. The answer to whether Rush’s work is
entitled to full protection of the First Amendment apparently
re-surfaces a few paragraphs later, but neither the analysis nor
the conclusion match up with the question that was originally

to his or her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant
transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive
primarily from the celebrity’s fame”).
182. ETW, 332 F.3d at 951 (Clay, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 937.
184. See id. at 937-38. The court expressly states that “Rush’s work does
not violate Woods’s right of publicity.” Id. at 937. One would think that this is
the end of the story, since if Woods’s right of publicity has not been violated,
then there is no cause of action, hence, no liability. Yet the beginning of the
next sentence continues with the analysis: “We further find that Rush’s work
is expression which is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.”
Id. at 937. Note that there is no language indicating that this is an
alternative argument but is a continuation of the prior analysis.
185. Id. at 925.
186. See id. at 937-38.
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asked.187 The court finally ends its First Amendment analysis
by stating that “the effect of limiting Woods’s right of publicity
in this case is negligible and significantly outweighed by
society’s interest in freedom of artistic expression”;188 but the
balancing here was neither necessary nor relevant to the issue
of whether Rush’s work was entitled to full First Amendment
protection.
Finally, the court announced it would apply the
“transformative elements” test to the facts at hand.189 In a
single, brief paragraph, it looked at the first prong of the test
and then simply stated that because the work has substantial
“transformative elements” it is entitled to First Amendment
protection.190
As described, none of the answers to the questions the
court originally set out to ask are directly on point. The only
inquiry that the court provides a direct response to is whether

187. Id.. The court says originally that it is considering whether Rush’s
work “is entitled to the full protection of First Amendment and not the more
limited protection afforded to commercial speech.” Id. at 937. It then notes
that “[w]hen we balance the magnitude of the speech restriction against the
interest in protecting Woods’s intellectual property right, we encounter
precisely the same considerations weighed by the Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons.”
Id. However, the Cardtoons court explicitly stated that it was applying a
balancing test to determine “whether Cardtoons’ First Amendment right
trumps [Major League Baseball’s] property right,” and did so only after it had
already discussed and concluded that the trading cards at issue in the case
were not commercial and were subject to the full protection of the First
Amendment. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95
F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996). The ETW court’s analysis is thus directed at
the wrong question.
188. ETW, 332 F.3d at 938. In essence, the ETW court was applying a test
that was supposed to be replaced by the “transformative elements” test.
Neither the Cardtoons test nor the “transformative elements” test has
anything to do with whether Rush’s work was entitled to the full protection of
the First Amendment.
189. ETW, 332 F.3d at 938.
190. Id. The court only goes so far as to state that “Rush’s work does not
capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods . . . [but] consists of a collage of
images . . . which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in
sports history and to convey a message about the significance of Woods’s
achievement in that event.” Id. It does not specifically address whether the
“marketability and economic value of the challenged work derives primarily
from the fame” of Tiger Woods or whether the “creativity, skill, and
reputation” of Rush gives it greater value. See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d at 810. In doing so, the court misses the point behind
the subsidiary prong: evaluation the economic harm to the celebrity, in
proportion to the amount of the work that can be said to be rightfully
“his/hers.” See id.
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Woods’s right of publicity is violated. However, it does so by
engaging in a balancing approach that would be better
addressed by the “transformative elements” analysis. If the
court is correct in stating that Woods’s right of publicity is not
violated, the decision should be over.191 Confusion abounds,
then, when the question of whether the First Amendment
applies is considered; confusion increases exponentially when
one considers that this question has already been asked and
answered. Throughout discussions of the right of publicity
violation and applicability of the First Amendment, the court
intermittently drops references to Rush’s addition of a
“significant creative component” to Woods’s “identity” and the
reduction of “commercial value” in Woods’s likeness, making it
look like the “transformative elements” test was really the only
issue the court was considering after all.192 When the court
actually addresses what it explicitly states is the
“transformative elements” test, it repeats the same arguments
and comes to a conclusion that the reader thought was already
made by the court.193 Ultimately, the ETW Court’s failure to
clearly and directly address the three questions it sets out to
analyze results in an analysis that keeps the reader guessing
where one question’s answer ends and where another’s begins,
and which questions are even relevant, much less essential, to
the court’s final decision in the case.
c. The Necessary Use of Ohio Common Law Made the
Analysis More Complex
A third major factor that makes the ETW decision
confusing is the fact that at the time of the decision, common
law, rather than broad statutory law, governed the right of
publicity in Ohio.194 The lack of case law regarding the right of
191. As noted supra note 184, if the court was intending to provide the
parties and the reader with alternative arguments, it fails to make this clear.
192. ETW, 332 F.3d at 922-38.
193. See id. at 938. The court ends this analysis by stating that “[b]ecause
Rush’s work has substantial transformative elements, it is entitled to the full
protection of the First Amendment. In this case, we find that Woods’s right of
publicity must yield to the First Amendment.” Id. As noted previously, the
question of whether the work is entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment was already determined prior to the right of publicity analysis,
and has nothing to do with whether the work has substantial transformative
elements.
194. Id. at 929 n.15 (stating that the right of publicity was codified in the
Ohio Revised Code, chapter 2741, in 1999). However, the ETW litigation
began before the effective date of the statute, and ETW did not invoke the
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publicity in Ohio forced the court to plunge into unfamiliar
territory with little or no guidance in its decision making
process.
As the court in ETW noted, Ohio did not have a statutory
right of publicity until 1999.195 While it was clear to the court
that a right of publicity existed, the Ohio case law on the
subject was incredibly sparse.196 By contrast, the court in
Comedy III had a broad California statute. The California
statute simply set forth the elements of a right of publicity and
did not incorporate any First Amendment concerns.197 This
made it much easier for the Comedy III court to determine first,
whether the right of publicity existed and next, whether and
how the First Amendment applied. By contrast, the ETW court
had to go through additional steps to define the right of
publicity in Ohio. This meant not only looking at Ohio cases,
but also interpreting inconsistent federal court authority and
Restatement provisions as well.198 Most of the cases the court
considered incorporated First Amendment concerns in their
primary lines of analysis, so the form of the right of publicity
that the cases adopted did not match up with the idea of a First
Amendment “affirmative defense.”199 Thus, when the court
relevant provisions. Id.
195. Id.
196. The ETW court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the
right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., but that there
were “few [other] Ohio decisions defining the contours of the right of publicity
in the aftermath of Zacchini.” See ETW, 332 F.3d at 929.
197. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800 (Cal.
2001). Section 990 of the California Civil Code stated, at the time the Comedy
III litigation was commenced:
Any person who uses a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in any products,
merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise goods, or services,
without prior consent from the person or persons specified in
subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof.
Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1 (1984)). The court noted that after it had
granted review, the California legislature renumbered the statute as § 3344.1
of the Civil Code, but that it was interpreting the former statute, so was
referring to it as section 990. Id. at 799 n.1 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1 (1999)).
198. See supra notes 109-125 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 109-125 and accompanying text. All the cases the
ETW court considered were, naturally, decided before the Comedy III decision.
While these cases were relevant to determining the basis for the Comedy III
“transformative elements” test, the difficulty with relying on them as
precedent was that the “transformative elements” test was intended to replace
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described the right of publicity in Ohio, it included many of the
concerns that underlie the “transformative elements” test
before it even got to the test as a defense. This is a major
source of confusion since it makes the “transformative
elements” test repeat the factors already considered by the
court under the inquiry of whether the right of publicity exists.
d. The Use of the Restatement and Accompanying Comments
Ignored the Fact That the “Transformative Elements” Test Was
Intended to Be an Affirmative Defense
The final factor that casts doubt on the “transformative
elements” test in ETW v. Jireh is the right of publicity
definition the court eventually settles on. The definition used
by the court incorporates considerations used by the
“transformative elements” test and thus ignores the fact that
the test was intended to be an affirmative defense.200
Consequently, the decision is unclear as to where the burden of
proof lies on the issues in the case.
After considering case law and possible interpretations of
the right of publicity, the ETW court finally settled on a
definition in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §
47, including comment (d).201 In order to evaluate completely
the different forms of analysis that they were decided upon.
200. The court stated:
In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to
his or her work, he or she may raise as an affirmative defense that
the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it
contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the
work does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810.
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47:
[T]he name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are used
‘for purposes of trade under the rule stated in § 46 if they are used in
advertising the user’s goods or services, or are placed on merchandise
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services
rendered by the user. However, uses ‘for purposes of trade’ does not
ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting,
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in
advertising that is incidental to such uses.
Id. at § 46. The Right of Publicity states “[o]ne who appropriates the
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.” Id.
Comment (d) of § 47 (which the ETW court said an Ohio court would construe
its right of publicity as) states that “some courts have engaged in an analysis
analogous to the determination of a fair use in copyright law.
The
substantiality and market effect of the appropriation have been analyzed in
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whether a right of publicity has been violated under this rule, a
court has to look to “the substantiality and market effect of the
use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the informational and
creative content of the defendant’s use.”202 This is, essentially,
what the “transformative elements” test does in its evaluation.
When considering the “market effect” and “informational and
creative content” in the right of publicity inquiry, the court is
taking the burden of proof away from the defendant and
placing it on the plaintiff, presumably a celebrity, in the first
instance. If a right of publicity under this rule exists, once a
court gets to the question of “transformative elements”, there is
little left to consider.
The existence of “transformative
elements” has in large part been proven, or disproven, already.
If a right of publicity does not exist under this rule, it is as if
the “transformative elements” test has already been applied,
with the plaintiff unfairly bearing the burden as to issues that
the Comedy III court intended to place at the defendant’s
feet.203 This upsets the balance that the Comedy III court
forged with the “transformative elements” test and unfairly
prejudices a plaintiff in an action to recover for infringement.
2. How the ETW Court Should Have Analyzed the Case to
Preserve the Future Value of the “Transformative Elements”
Test
a. Ways the Decision Could Have Been Improved
There are a number of ways that the court in ETW could
have improved the quality of its decision and preserved the
value of the “transformative elements” test. Most importantly,
the court should have separated the Lanham Act and right of
publicity claims, explained their substance and interaction with
the First Amendment separately, and then applied them to the
ETW facts in different sections. This would have avoided many
of the problems in the analysis by simply clarifying what logic
applied to each cause of action and how future courts should
use the First Amendment defenses in relation to both of them.
Second, the court should have expressly stated the three-step
inquiry it appeared to be engaging in, and then directly
light of the informational or creative content of the defendant’s use.” Id. at §
47 cmt. d (1995). This is essentially the Comedy III “transformative elements”
test.
202. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d at 937.
203. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810.
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addressed each question, without borrowing language or
reasoning from the other inquiries.
The ETW court should have also defined the Ohio right of
publicity differently. The actual Restatement definition of the
right of publicity is clear: “One who appropriates the
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity
for purposes of trade is subject to liability.”204 It is the
comment from the subsequent section that takes this
description and incorporates portions of the “transformative
elements” test. While the main part of the rule focuses on the
celebrity, the comment focuses on the artist’s contribution,
which is the proper function of the “transformative elements”
affirmative defense. Thus, the court should have ignored the
comment and stuck to the basic rule for the purposes of
determining whether Woods’s right of publicity was violated in
this case.
If the court had defined the Ohio right of publicity as such,
it would have made the three step analysis it was trying to
engage in much clearer. Since Rush was selling a painting
with Woods’s likeness on it without his consent, Woods’s right
of publicity had been violated. Yet as non-commercial speech,
Rush’s painting was entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment. Then the court could have moved on to a much
better examination of the “transformative elements” inquiry.
b. Applying the “Transformative Elements” Test
Once the court finally arrived at the “transformative
elements” test, it should have looked at the factors the Comedy
III court set out in greater detail. Under the first prong of the
test, it appears that Rush probably added “significant
expression” beyond just the “literal depiction or imitation” of
Tiger Woods.205 While the focal point(s) of the painting are
three images of Tiger, he is not the only person, thing, or even
celebrity depicted.206 The golf course, the caddy, the scenery,
and the historical setting of the event all add to the work.
Tiger appears to be only one of many “raw materials”207 from

204. ETW, 332 F.3d at 930 (quoting RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION,
supra note 85, § 47 (1995)).
205. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808-09.
206. ETW, 332 F.3d at 918, 919 n.1.
207. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
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which the painting is formed, considering the substantial
portion of the work that is devoted to evoking images of past
golf champions, the uniqueness of this moment in history, and
the “feel” of the setting in which it takes place. Undeniably,
this work appears to be much more than just “Tiger”—it is
capturing something much bigger. Rush has sought to express
not just the essence of “Tiger Woods,” but of golf, of Georgia, of
history, and probably of the emotion of sports in general.
Looking at the painting in a “quantitative” rather than
“qualitative” manner,208 the literal or imitative elements of
Tiger Woods are only three poses. The “creative” elements are
much more numerous.
Under the second prong, the marketability prong, some of
the value of the work does come from Tiger Woods himself.
Many people who buy such a painting will be fans of Tiger
Woods. However, considering the following Rush has gathered,
it is likely that a significant number of people who buy the
painting are Rush fans as well.209 Others may be simply golf
fans or fans of the historic golf legends in the painting. Still
others may be residents of Augusta who want to commemorate
the event. No matter what their reasons, it is probable that
because the painting contains much more than just Tiger’s face,
body, or likeness, its value is due at least as much to the other
facets of expression in the painting as it is to Tiger. Unlike the
three bare faces depicted in Comedy III, there is so much more
to the painting here than simply Tiger. As a result, his fame,
while significant, cannot account for its entire value.
C. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DECISIONS
Considering the volume of criticism that accompanied the
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,210
decision,211 the ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.212 decision
is likely to come under significant fire as well. The problems
with the ETW court’s analysis of the right of publicity will
almost certainly add to the criticism of the “transformative
elements” test. Legal scholars already skeptical about the test
will find much fuel for their fire in the ETW decision; the poor

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 809.
See text accompanying notes 94-96.
21 P.3d 797.
See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
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organization, failure to address the appropriate issues at the
appropriate times, and the incomplete use of the
‘transformative elements” test exaggerates the problems
inherent in using any standard to judge a piece of artwork.213
However, courts that wish to adopt the “transformative
elements” test can avoid these problems in the same ways the
ETW court could have avoided problems. First and foremost,
the right of publicity claims should be clearly separated from
other claims, such as the Lanham Act claims. Courts should
then identify the right of publicity statute or doctrine
applicable in that jurisdiction, clearly define it, and determine
whether that right has been violated. If a court finds that it
has been violated, the First Amendment defense may be raised
by the defendant. The First Amendment analysis consists of
two basic parts. First, defendant must show a particular piece
of work is subject to full First Amendment protection.214
Second, the defendant must fulfill the two pronged
“transformative elements” test: she bears the burden of
showing not only that her artwork contains significant
“transformative elements” such that it has become “primarily
[her] own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness,”215
but that the “marketability and economic value of the
challenged work [does not] derive from the fame of the celebrity
depicted” but “principally from some other source.”216
Following this simple pattern will avoid confusion and allow
courts to move forward with the “transformative elements” test,
refining and molding it along the way to better address the
concerns raised by legal scholars and assure that not only
celebrities and artists, but society as a whole, is enhanced by
the results of their decisions.

213. Legal standards used to judge art have difficulties such as vagueness,
subjectivity, and difficulty in transferring the standard to different mediums.
214. How a court should go about doing this is controversial. This
comment saves that question for another day. However, considering the fact
that whether or not something like Rush’s work is entitled to the full
protection of the First Amendment is still being discussed, any court seeking
to provide a well thought out analysis and decision should therefore at least
address the position that it is taking in that particular state or circuit. See
supra note 47.
215. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
216. Id. at 810.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,217 the court
adopted the “transformative elements” test first elaborated in
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.218 The test
states:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on
the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond
that trespass, the state law interests in protecting the fruits of
artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative
artist.219

However, “when a work contains significant transformative
elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment
protection, but is also less likely to interfere with the economic
interest protected by the right of publicity.”220 Attempting to
provide a detailed analysis of the First Amendment and right of
publicity issues in the case, the ETW court examined both state
and federal jurisprudence regarding the right of publicity and
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.
It then
determined that Ohio case law and the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition would determine whether Rush’s prints
violated Woods’s right of publicity. To draw the line “between
Woods’s intellectual property rights and the First Amendment”,
the court stated that it would follow the reasoning of decisions
in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.221 Finally, the court
decided that balancing the First Amendment and the right of
publicity would be done under the “transformative elements”
test.222 Through a confusing and disjointed application of these
principles, the court concluded that Tiger Woods’s right of
publicity did not trump Rush’s First Amendment rights and
granted summary judgment in favor of Rush.
The “transformative elements” test as established by the
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.223 court is
practicable because it strikes the appropriate balance between
the celebrity’s interests and the artist’s rights, and leaves room
for courts to make the fact specific determinations necessary to
ensure fair results in unavoidably subjective decisions. In
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

332 F.3d 915.
21 P.3d 797.
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808.
Id.
ETW, 332 F.3d at 936.
Id.
21 P.3d 797.
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addition, alternatives proposed up to this point do not offer
realistic suggestions for either increasing clarity or decreasing
subjectivity in court decisions, nor do they address the
significant economic benefits that celebrities receive from some
unauthorized use of their identities.
Yet the decision in ETW puts the “transformative
elements” test in jeopardy because the court’s analysis makes
the test appear confusing and unworkable. However, a close
analysis of the decision reveals that a number of other factors
in the court’s decision contribute: the court uses an
inappropriate structure to tackle the problem, it fails to answer
the questions it asks, the use of Ohio common law made the
analysis more complex, and the court’s use of the Restatement
and accompanying comments to determine whether Woods had
a right of publicity leads it to ignore the fact that the
“transformative elements” test was intended to be an
affirmative defense.
The ETW court should have separated the Lanham Act and
right of publicity claims and then explained and applied their
interaction with the First Amendment and the facts of ETW
separately. It should have also directly addressed the three
questions it asked at the outset of the analysis and avoided
overlapping language and reasoning between them. In sum, a
court addressing a similar case in the future has a simple,
straightforward task: identify the right of publicity statute or
doctrine applicable in that jurisdiction, clearly define it, and
determine whether that right has been violated. Further, the
First Amendment defense may be raised by the defendant, who
must first show that a particular piece of work is subject to full
First Amendment protection. The defendant must then meet
the requirements of the “transformative elements” test by
demonstrating that the artwork contains significant
transformative elements such “that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s
likeness”,224 and that the “marketability and economic value of
the challenged work [does not] derive from the fame of the
celebrity depicted” but “principally from some other source.”225
If a court sticks to this analysis, many of the confusions that
look inevitable after the ETW decision will disappear, and
courts will be able to judge the “transformative elements” test
224. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
225. Id. at 810.
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on its true worth. If necessary, courts can refine the test to
address the concerns raised by legal scholars in both writing
and practice. A better analysis will lead to a better test, which,
in the end ensures that the public receives greater benefits
from both the right of publicity and the First Amendment with
reduced costs.

